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eral common law and of the interpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 17899 as well. As to section 34, even the muse of the Erie priesthood confesses difficulty and goes so far as to assert that Professor
Crosskey is "persuasive" in his approach to the significance of Charles
Warren's discoveries."
But whatever occasional fault this book may
have, it is certain to be essential to an understanding and appreciation of
Alexander Hamilton.
FRANCIS PASCHALt

By Fowler
V. Harper, introduction by Irving Brant. Indianapolis and New York:
Bobbs-Merrill. 1965. Pp. xxv, 406. $6.95.
JUSTICE RUTLEDGE AND THE BRIGHT CONSTELLATION.

It was the nation's misfortune, as well as his own, that Wiley B.
Rutledge served for so short a time on the Supreme Court bench. The
six-year span from 1943 to 1949 was hardly long enough to project a
widely recognized public image; it is reasonable to speculate that, had
he lived to twice that length of time on the bench, the matured philosophy
which he brought from a lifetime of teaching might have accelerated the
forces which, half a dozen years later, ushered in the present epochal sequence of constitutional decisions. Rutledge was the last of the appointees
of Franklin D. Roosevelt; the first, Mr. Justice Black, has enjoyed a
tenure of sufficient length to epitomize the judicial function as F.D.R.
presumably envisioned it-although another early F.D.R. appointee, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, remained long enough to undergo a jurisprudential
sea-change.
In any event, Mr. Justice Rutledge bolstered a core of constitutional
liberals among whom could be counted Black, Robert H. Jackson, and
William 0. Douglas, supported with fair consistency by Mr. Chief Justice
Stone and Frank Murphy. In the very heart of the second World War,
President Roosevelt at last had his ideological majority of men who were
aware, if the war itself had not been a reminder, that a far more complex
economic and social fabric was in the making. The simple truths of a
frontier society had not been refuted so much as they had become irrelevant; to find new constitutional propositions consistent with the past but
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appropriate to the present required a court intellectually equipped, in
Brandeis' phrase, to guide by the light of reason by letting the mind be
bold.
This was the exciting prospect when Rutledge came to the court; the
pity was that time ran out before this combination of jurists could make
its indelible imprint upon the tribunal. Roosevelt died within two years,
and Stone within three; of the four Truman appointees to the bench, only
Mr. Justice Clark could be said to have contributed significantly to subsequent judicial development, while the Vinson nomination to the chief
justiceship can most charitably be described as a retrogression. The
deaths of Rutledge and Murphy in this same period accelerated the retreat from the bold advancements which had seemed so certain a halfdozen years before. It would be another half-dozen years before the
Warren court would resume the dynamic policies which had been in
prospect in 1943.
The foregoing paragraphs may help to put into perspective the present work on Mr. Justice Rutledge, prepared by men who knew not only
him but also the forces at work upon the Supreme Court as an institution
and within it as an aggregate of personal strengths and weaknesses. This
work is not designed as a full-scale biography; seven of the ten chapters
are devoted to Rutledge's work on the bench as a champion of human
rights. The chief contribution of the book is its intimate description of
judicial draftsmanship and the interplay of personalities and procedures
on the court, as a backdrop to the role played by Rutledge himself in shaping some of the civil liberties opinions of the time.
Perhaps the chief weaknesses of the book are the fact that Irving
Brant, who knew Rutledge so well, takes for granted that the average
reader also somehow is familiar with Rutledge's legal philosophy before
he came to the bench-and the fact that Fowler Harper, who knew so
well the constitutional issues which dominated the 1940's, expostulates
upon some of the issues in such detail that a chapter is often more Harper
than Rutledge. What both contributors to this volume have been undertaking has been to retouch and intensify the picture of a potentially great
jurist which was rapidly fading in contemporary memory. If they did no
more than to arrest the fading process, their accomplishment was significant. The full-scale biography is still desirable wherein there would
be more detail concerning the intellectual milestones passed in reaching
the stature that Wiley Rutledge attained.
Professor Harper has really written about two men in the course of
his judicial biography of the one, for Irving Brant, the close friend of
Rutledge in their St. Louis days and one of the half-dozen journalistic

606

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

experts on the Supreme Court's history and functioning, is an indispensable figure in the story throughout. "The man who more than any other
single person was responsible for Rutledge's judicial career was the distinguished Madison biographer," the author declares. The two had been
brought together by a common concern at the thwarting of much early
New Deal legislation by the original Hughes court; and when, by 1938,
it seemed likely that two or more appointments to the bench would reverse
the ideological balance, Brant began his systematic efforts to advance the
man whom he had known first as law dean at Washington University
and subsequently as dean at the State University of Iowa.
Rutledge was a logical candidate for the so-called "western seat" on
the court; a graduate of the University of Wisconsin who, after a year
of law study at Indiana, completed his law degree at Colorado and had
spent his whole career between the Mississippi Valley and the Rockies.
The first "western" appointee was Douglas; Brant could find no fault
with this choice because, he wrote, as between the two men "the only material distinction . .

is that Rutledge reaches instantaneously right

moral conclusions, Douglas reaches ultimately right moral conclusions."
When Douglas went to the Supreme Court, Rutledge was moved into a
clearly preparatory post as a judge of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. From there, several years later with judicial seasoning added to his academic qualifications-for Roosevelt had
been criticized for the preponderance of law professors he was naming to
the federal courts-Rutledge at length was advanced to the highest
tribunal.
Brant's role in continually placing Rutledge's qualifications before
Roosevelt, the attorney-general, the state and national leaders of the bar,
and members of Congress, is the subject of a highly informative chapter
on the manner in which a Supreme Court justice may be chosen. Equally
informative, in the chapters on Rutledge's actual work on the bench, are
the notes and memoranda from his papers which reveal the interplay of
personalities and philosophies as the justices go about their work. Indeed, the most valuable of all work on the court are those studies which,
like this one or like Alpheus Thomas Mason's book on Stone, can draw
upon the intimate and often discarded drafts circulated among the members of the bench in the course of decision making. Professor Mason
was given access to the Chief Justice's voluminous files in the Library
of Congress and Columbia University; Professor Harper has, in addition
to the Rutledge papers, the invaluable added asset of Irving Brant's own
records and personal recollections.
From these pages, then, emerges the portrait of the type of justice
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sought, with varying degrees of perception, by presidents from Roosevelt
to Johnson. In the matter of civil and political rights of the individual,
this justice is immovable; in the face of an increasingly corporate society,
Leviathan is not to be permitted to crush Everyman. In the matter of
the function of modern government, this justice is the ultimate federalist;
the proposition that state sovereignty is absolute in its proper sphere is
not to be permitted to stifle the proposition that national sovereignty is
equally absolute in its sphere-and that new and unanticipated needs may
determine the sphere of activity in which the response must be made. In
summarizing Rutledge's position, the author happily catches the essence
of modern constitutional liberalism:
As to the power of the states to legislate in the field of interstate and foreign commerce, Rutledge . . . recognized a distinction between matters in which national uniformity is desirable and necessary and those admitting of diversity regulation.
As to the first, the states were powerless to act, regardless of
federal legislation or its absence. As to the second class of
problems, the states could legislate in the absence of congressional action.
The constitutional conservative-the prototype of the Hughes court
prior to 1937-was willing to deny power to the states under the second
class in order to strengthen the denial of power to the federal government under either. The constitutional liberal of the Rutledge vintage
took the opposite view:
But even though Congress has acted in the second category of
cases, there might still be room for state legislation which is not
in conflict with the national laws. So too, Congress on occasion has enacted "permissive" legislation, thus allowing, as legitimate, state regnlation which otherwise would be in the area
exclusively reserved for federal action.
Rutledge subscribed to the proposition that the ultimate test was the need
for action, whereupon the appropriate sphere of the action would be determined by the nature of the problem.
Rutledge, then, appears to have come close to the type of justice that
Roosevelt was seeking-the prototype into which Black developed, from
which Frankfurter departed, and to which-as Brant perceived-Douglas
conformed. For a brief and shining interval, the first years of Rutledge's
overdue appointment to the court, the court of the modern twentieth cen-
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tury was at its zenith, and the role of Wiley B. Rutledge was to cumulate
and complement the efforts to bring it to that eminence.
WILLIAM

F.

SWINDLERt

t Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary.

